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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
TACOMA DIVISION

BRANDY RHODES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MONSANTO COMPANY,

Defendant.

NO.

**COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES**

Plaintiff, Brandy Rhodes, for her causes of action against the above-named Defendant, alleges and states on information and belief as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. In 1970, Defendant Monsanto Company, Inc. (“Monsanto”) discovered the herbicidal properties of glyphosate and began marketing it in products in 1974 under the brand name Roundup®. Roundup® is a non-selective herbicide used to kill weeds that commonly compete with the growing of crops. In addition to the active ingredient glyphosate, Roundup® contains the surfactant Polyethoxylated tallow amine (“POEA”) and/or adjuvants and other so-called “inert” ingredients. In 2001, glyphosate was the most-used pesticide active ingredient in

1 American agriculture with 85-90 million pounds used annually. That number grew to 185 million
2 pounds in 2007.¹ As of 2013, glyphosate was the world's most widely used herbicide.

3 2. Monsanto is a multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation based in St.
4 Louis, Missouri, and incorporated in Delaware. It is the world's leading producer of glyphosate.
5 As of 2009, Monsanto was the world's leading producer of seeds, accounting for 27% of the
6 world seed market². The majority of these seeds are of the Roundup Ready® brand. The stated
7 advantage of Roundup Ready® crops is that they substantially improve a farmer's ability to
8 control weeds, because glyphosate can be sprayed in the fields during the growing season
9 without harming the crops. In 2010, an estimated 70% of corn and cotton and 90% of soybean
10 fields in the United States were Roundup Ready®.³

11 3. Monsanto's glyphosate products are registered in 130 countries and approved for
12 use on over 100 different crops⁴. They are ubiquitous in the environment. Numerous studies
13 confirm that glyphosate is found in rivers, streams, and groundwater in agricultural areas where
14 Roundup® is used⁵. It has been found in food⁶, in the urine of agricultural workers⁷, and even
15 in the urine of urban dwellers who are not in direct contact with glyphosate⁸.

16 _____
17 1 Arthur Grube et al., U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Pesticides Industry Sales and Usage, 2006–*
18 *2007 Market Estimates* 14 (2011), available at

19 https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/market_estimates2007.pdf

20 2 ETC Group, *Who Will Control the Green Economy?* 22 (2011), available at

21 http://www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf

22 3 William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, *Farmers Cope With Roundup-Resistant Weeds*, N.Y.
23 TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-environment/04weed.html?pagewanted=all)
24 [environment/04weed.html?pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-environment/04weed.html?pagewanted=all)

4 Monsanto, *Backgrounder-History of Monsanto's Glyphosate Herbicides* (June 2015),
https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/06/back_history.pdf

5 See U.S. Geological Survey, *USGS Technical Announcement: Widely Used Herbicide*
Commonly Found in Rain and Streams in the Mississippi River Basin (2011), available at
[http://www.infiniteunknown.net/2015/07/26/usgs-technical-announcement-widely-used-](http://www.infiniteunknown.net/2015/07/26/usgs-technical-announcement-widely-used-herbicide-commonly-found-in-rain-and-streams-in-the-mississippi-river-basin/)
[herbicide-commonly-found-in-rain-and-streams-in-the-mississippi-river-basin/](http://www.infiniteunknown.net/2015/07/26/usgs-technical-announcement-widely-used-herbicide-commonly-found-in-rain-and-streams-in-the-mississippi-river-basin/); see also U.S.

1 4. On March 20, 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (“IARC”),
2 an agency of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), issued an evaluation of several
3 herbicides, including glyphosate. That evaluation was based, in part, on studies of exposures to
4 glyphosate in several countries around the world, and it traces the health implications from
5 exposure to glyphosate since 2001.

6 5. On July 29, 2015, IARC issued the formal monograph relating to glyphosate. In
7 that monograph, the IARC Working Group provides a thorough review of the numerous studies
8 and data relating to glyphosate exposure in humans.

9 6. The IARC Working Group classified glyphosate as a Group 2A herbicide, which
10 means that it is *probably carcinogenic to humans*. The IARC Working Group concluded that the
11 cancers most associated with glyphosate exposure are non-Hodgkin lymphoma and other
12 haematopoietic cancers, including lymphocytic lymphoma / chronic lymphocytic leukemia, B-
13 cell lymphoma, and multiple myeloma⁹

15 Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Technical Factsheet on: Glyphosate*, available at
16 <https://www.beyondpesticides.org/assets/media/documents/EPAGlyphosate.pdf>
17 6 Thomas Bohn et al., *Compositional Differences in Soybeans on the Market: Glyphosate
18 Accumulates in Roundup Ready GM Soybeans*, 153 FOOD CHEMISTRY 207 (2013), available
19 at <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308814613019201>
20 7 John F. Acquavella et al., *Glyphosate Biomonitoring for Farmers and Their Families: Results
21 from the Farm Family Exposure Study*, 112(3) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 321
22 (2004), available at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1241861/>; Kathryn Z.
23 Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon &
24 Glyphosate*, 112 IARC Monographs 76, section 5.4 (2015), available at
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045\(15\)70134-8](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1470-2045(15)70134-8)
8 Dirk Brändli & Sandra Reinacher, *Herbicides found in Human Urine*, 1 ITHAKA JOURNAL
270 (2012), available at [http://www.ithaka-journal.net/druckversionen/e052012-herbicides-
urine.pdf](http://www.ithaka-journal.net/druckversionen/e052012-herbicides-urine.pdf).
9 See Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon &
Glyphosate*, *supra*.

1 **THE PARTIES**

2 13. Plaintiff, Brandy Rhodes, is a resident of Vancouver, Washington. Ms. Rhodes
3 was exposed to Roundup® from approximately six years while residing in La Center,
4 Washington. The city of La Center routinely applied Roundup® to the parks and greenery near
5 Ms. Rhodes’ residence and the parks she visited with her children. In or about December, 2005,
6 Ms. Rhodes was diagnosed with Stage IIA Nodular Sclerosing Hodgkin’s Lymphoma.

7 14. Defendant Monsanto Company is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
8 and principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.

9 15. At all times relevant to this complaint, Monsanto was the entity that discovered
10 the herbicidal properties of glyphosate and the manufacturer of Roundup®, which contains the
11 active ingredient glyphosate and the surfactant POEA, as well as adjuvants and other “inert”
12 ingredients.

13 **FACTS**

14 16. Glyphosate is a broad-spectrum, non-selective herbicide used in a wide variety of
15 herbicidal products around the world.

16 17. Plants treated with glyphosate translocate the systemic herbicide to their roots,
17 shoot regions, and fruit, where it interferes with the plant’s ability to form aromatic amino acids
18 necessary for protein synthesis. Treated plants generally die within two to three days. Because
19 plants absorb glyphosate, it cannot be completely removed by washing or peeling produce or by
20 milling, baking, or brewing grains.

21 18. For nearly 40 years, farms across the world have used Roundup® without
22 knowing of the dangers its use poses. That is because when Monsanto first introduced
23 Roundup®, it touted glyphosate as a technological breakthrough: it could kill almost every weed

1 without causing harm either to people or to the environment. Of course, history has shown that
2 not to be true. According to the WHO, the main chemical ingredient of Roundup® – glyphosate
3 – is a probable cause of cancer. Those most at risk are farm workers and other individuals with
4 workplace exposure to Roundup®, such as garden center workers, nursery workers, and
5 landscapers. Monsanto assured the public that Roundup® was harmless. In order to prove this,
6 Monsanto has championed falsified data and has attacked legitimate studies that revealed the
7 dangers of Roundup®. Monsanto has led a prolonged campaign of misinformation to convince
8 government agencies, farmers and the general population that Roundup® is safe.

9 *The Discovery of Glyphosate and Development of Roundup®*

10 19. The herbicidal properties of glyphosate were discovered in 1970 by Monsanto
11 chemist John Franz. The first glyphosate-based herbicide was introduced to the market in the
12 mid-1970s under the brand name Roundup®.¹⁰ From the outset, Monsanto marketed Roundup®
13 as a “safe” general-purpose herbicide for widespread commercial and consumer use. It still
14 markets Roundup® as safe today.¹¹

15 20. In addition to the active ingredient glyphosate, Roundup® formulations also
16 contain adjuvants and other chemicals, such as the surfactant POEA, which are considered
17 “inert” and therefore protected as “trade secrets” in manufacturing. Growing evidence suggests
18 that these adjuvants and additional components of Roundup® formulations are not, in fact, inert
19 but are toxic in their own right.

20 10 Monsanto, *Backgrounder, History of Monsanto’s Glyphosate Herbicide* (June 2015),
21 https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/06/back_history.pdf

22 11 Monsanto, *What is Glyphosate?* (Sep. 2, 2015),
23 <http://www.monsantoglobal.com/global/au/products/pages/what-is-glyphosate-and-what-makes-it-safe.aspx>

Registration of Herbicides under Federal Law

1
2 21. The manufacture, formulation, and distribution of herbicides, such as Roundup®,
3 are regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA” or “Act”),
4 7 U.S.C. § 136 *et seq.* FIFRA requires that all pesticides be registered with the Environmental
5 Protection Agency (“EPA” or “Agency”) prior to their distribution, sale, or use, except as
6 described by the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).

7 22. Because pesticides are toxic to plants, animals, and humans, at least to some
8 degree, the EPA requires as part of the registration process, among other things, a variety of tests
9 to evaluate the potential for exposure to pesticides, toxicity to people and other potential non-
10 target organisms, and other adverse effects on the environment. Registration by the EPA,
11 however, is not an assurance or finding of safety. The determination the Agency must make in
12 registering or re-registering a product is not that the product is “safe,” but rather that use of the
13 product in accordance with its label directions “will not generally cause unreasonable adverse
14 effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D).

15 23. FIFRA defines “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” to mean “any
16 unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and
17 environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). FIFRA thus
18 requires the EPA to make a risk/benefit analysis in determining whether a registration should be
19 granted or a pesticide allowed to continue to be sold in commerce.

20 24. The EPA and the State of California registered Roundup distribution, sale, and
21 manufacture in the United States and the State of California.

22 25. FIFRA generally requires that the registrant, Monsanto in the case of Roundup®,
23 conducts the health and safety testing of pesticide products. The EPA has protocols governing
24

1 the conduct of tests required for registration and the laboratory practices that must be followed in
2 conducting these tests. The data produced by the registrant must be submitted to the EPA for
3 review and evaluation. The government is not required, nor is it able, however, to perform the
4 product tests that are required of the manufacturer.

5 26. The evaluation of each pesticide product distributed, sold, or manufactured is
6 completed at the time the product is initially registered. The data necessary for registration of a
7 pesticide has changed over time. The EPA is now in the process of re-evaluating all pesticide
8 products through a Congressionally-mandated process called “re-registration.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a-
9 1. In order to reevaluate these pesticides, the EPA is demanding the completion of additional
10 tests and the submission of data for the EPA’s recent review and evaluation.

11 27. In the case of glyphosate, and therefore Roundup®, the EPA had planned on
12 releasing its preliminary risk assessment -- in relation to the reregistration process -- no later than
13 July 2015. The EPA completed its review of glyphosate in early 2015, but it delayed releasing
14 the risk assessment pending further review in light of the WHO’s health-related findings.

15 ***Scientific Fraud Underlying the Marketing and Sale of Glyphosate/Roundup®***

16 28. Based on early studies showing that glyphosate could cause cancer in laboratory
17 animals, the EPA originally classified glyphosate as *possibly carcinogenic to humans* (Group C)
18 in 1985. After pressure from Monsanto, including contrary studies it provided to the EPA, the
19 EPA changed its classification to *evidence of non-carcinogenicity in humans* (Group E) in 1991.
20 In so classifying glyphosate, however, the EPA made clear that the designation did not mean the
21 chemical does not cause cancer: “It should be emphasized, however, that designation of an agent
22 in Group E is based on the available evidence at the time of evaluation and should not be
23
24

1 interpreted as a definitive conclusion that the agent will not be a carcinogen under any
2 circumstances.”¹²

3 29. On two occasions, the EPA found that the laboratories hired by Monsanto to test
4 the toxicity of its Roundup® products for registration purposes committed fraud.

5 30. In the first instance, Monsanto, in seeking initial registration of Roundup® by the
6 EPA, hired Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories (“IBT”) to perform and evaluate pesticide
7 toxicology studies relating to Roundup®.¹³ IBT performed about 30 tests on glyphosate and
8 glyphosate-containing products, including nine of the 15 residue studies needed to register
9 Roundup®.

10 31. In 1976, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) performed an
11 inspection of IBT that revealed discrepancies between the raw data and the final report relating
12 to the toxicological impacts of glyphosate. The EPA subsequently audited IBT; it too found the
13 toxicology studies conducted for the Roundup® herbicide to be invalid.¹⁴ An EPA reviewer
14 stated, after finding “routine falsification of data” at IBT, that it was “hard to believe the

15 _____
16 12 U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Memorandum, Subject: SECOND Peer Review of Glyphosate 1*
(1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/cleared_reviews/csr_PC-103601_30-Oct-91_265.pdf.

17 13 Monsanto, *Backgrounder, Testing Fraud: IBT and Craven Laboratories*,
18 https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/06/ibt_craven_bkg.pdf

19 14 U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Summary of the IBT Review Program Office of Pesticide Programs*
(1983), available at

20 <https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/91014ULV.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=1981+Thru+1985&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFieldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles%5CIndex%20Data%5C81thru85%5CTxt%5C00000022%5C91014ULV.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=anonymous&SortMethod=h%7C-&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=hpfr&DefSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyEntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL>

1 scientific integrity of the studies when they said they took specimens of the uterus from male
2 rabbits.”¹⁵

3 32. Three top executives of IBT were convicted of fraud in 1983.

4 33. In the second incident of data falsification, Monsanto hired Craven Laboratories
5 in 1991 to perform pesticide and herbicide studies, including for Roundup®. In that same year,
6 the owner of Craven Laboratories and three of its employees were indicted, and later convicted,
7 of fraudulent laboratory practices in the testing of pesticides and herbicides.¹⁶

8 34. Despite the falsity of the tests that underlie its registration, within a few years of
9 its launch, Monsanto was marketing Roundup® in 115 countries.

10 ***The Importance of Roundup® to Monsanto’s Market Dominance Profits***

11 35. The success of Roundup® was key to Monsanto’s continued reputation and
12 dominance in the marketplace. Largely due to the success of Roundup® sales, Monsanto’s
13 agriculture division was out-performing its chemicals division’s operating income, and that gap
14 increased yearly. But with its patent for glyphosate expiring in the United States in the year
15 2000, Monsanto needed a strategy to maintain its Roundup® market dominance and to ward off
16 impending competition.

17 36. In response, Monsanto began the development and sale of genetically engineered
18 Roundup Ready® seeds in 1996. Since Roundup Ready® crops are resistant to glyphosate,
19 farmers can spray Roundup® onto their fields during the growing season without harming the
20

21 ¹⁵ Marie-Monique Robin, *The World According to Monsanto: Pollution, Corruption and the*
22 *Control of the World’s Food Supply* (2011) (citing U.S. Env’tl. Prot. Agency, *Data Validation,*
23 *Memo from K. Locke, Toxicology Branch, to R. Taylor, Registration Branch. Washington, D.C.*
(August 9, 1978)).

24 ¹⁶ Monsanto, *Backgrounder, Testing Fraud: IBT and Craven Laboratories, supra.*

1 crop. This allowed Monsanto to expand its market for Roundup® even further; by 2000,
 2 Monsanto's biotechnology seeds were planted on more than 80 million acres worldwide and
 3 nearly 70% of American soybeans were planted from Roundup Ready® seeds. It also secured
 4 Monsanto's dominant share of the glyphosate/Roundup® market through a marketing strategy
 5 that coupled proprietary Roundup Ready® seeds with continued sales of its Roundup®
 6 herbicide.

7 37. Through a three-pronged strategy of increasing production, decreasing prices, and
 8 by coupling with Roundup Ready® seeds, Roundup® became Monsanto's most profitable
 9 product. In 2000, Roundup® accounted for almost \$2.8 billion in sales, outselling other
 10 herbicides by a margin of five to one, and accounting for close to half of Monsanto's revenue.¹⁷
 11 Today, glyphosate remains one of the world's largest herbicides by sales volume.

12 ***Monsanto has known for decades that it falsely advertises the safety of Roundup®***

13 38. In 1996, the New York Attorney General ("NYAG") filed a lawsuit against
 14 Monsanto based on its false and misleading advertising of Roundup® products. Specifically, the
 15 lawsuit challenged Monsanto's general representations that its spray-on glyphosate-based
 16 herbicides, including Roundup®, were "**safer than table salt**" and "**practically non-toxic**" to
 17 mammals, birds, and fish. Among the representations the NYAG found deceptive and misleading
 18 about the human and environmental safety of glyphosate and/or Roundup® are the following:

- 19 a) "Remember that environmentally friendly Roundup herbicide is
 20 biodegradable. It won't build up in the soil so you can use Roundup
 with confidence along customers' driveways, sidewalks and fences ..."

21
 22 ¹⁷ David Barboza, *The Power of Roundup; A Weed Killer Is A Block for Monsanto to Build On*,
 23 N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/02/business/the-
 power-of-roundup-a-weed-killer-is-a-block-for-monsanto-to-build-on.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/02/business/the-power-of-roundup-a-weed-killer-is-a-block-for-monsanto-to-build-on.html).

- 1 b) “And remember that Roundup is biodegradable and won’t build up in
2 the soil. That will give you the environmental confidence you need to
3 use Roundup everywhere you’ve got a weed, brush, edging or
4 trimming problem.”
- 5 c) “Roundup biodegrades into naturally occurring elements.”
- 6 d) “Remember that versatile Roundup herbicide stays where you put it.
7 That means there’s no washing or leaching to harm customers’ shrubs
8 or other desirable vegetation.”
- 9 e) “This non-residual herbicide will not wash or leach in the soil. It ...
10 stays where you apply it.”
- 11 f) “You can apply Accord with ‘confidence because it will stay where
12 you put it’ it bonds tightly to soil particles, preventing leaching. Then,
13 soon after application, soil microorganisms biodegrade Accord into
14 natural products.”
- 15 g) “Glyphosate is less toxic to rats than table salt following acute oral
16 ingestion.”
- 17 h) “Glyphosate’s safety margin is much greater than required. It has over
18 a 1,000-fold safety margin in food and over a 700-fold safety margin
19 for workers who manufacture it or use it.
- 20 i) “You can feel good about using herbicides by Monsanto. They
21 carry a toxicity category rating of ‘practically non-toxic’ as it pertains
22 to mammals, birds and fish.”
- 23 j) “Roundup can be used where kids and pets will play and breaks down
24 into natural material.” This ad depicts a person with his head in the
ground and a pet dog standing in an area which has been treated with
Roundup.¹⁸

39. On November 19, 1996, Monsanto entered into an Assurance of Discontinuance with NYAG, in which Monsanto agreed, among other things, “to cease and desist from publishing or broadcasting any advertisements [in New York] that represent, directly or by implication” that:

18 Attorney General of the State of New York, In the Matter of Monsanto Company,
23 Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15) (Nov. 1996).

1 a) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component
2 thereof are safe, non-toxic, harmless or free from risk.

3 * * *

4 b) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof
5 manufactured, formulated, distributed or sold by Monsanto are
6 biodegradable

7 * * *

8 c) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof
9 stay where they are applied under all circumstances and will not move
10 through the environment by any means.

11 * * *

12 d) its glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof
13 are “good” for the environment or are “known for their environmental
14 characteristics.”

15 * * *

16 e) glyphosate-containing pesticide products or any component thereof are
17 safer or less toxic than common consumer products other than
18 herbicides;

19 f) its glyphosate-containing products or any component thereof might be
20 classified as “practically non-toxic.”

21
22 40. Monsanto did not alter its advertising in the same manner in any state other than
23 New York, and on information and belief it still has not done so today.

24 41. In 2009, France’s highest court ruled that Monsanto had not told the truth about
the safety of Roundup®. The French court affirmed an earlier judgment that Monsanto had
falsely advertised its herbicide Roundup® as “biodegradable” and that it “left the soil clean.”¹⁹

¹⁹ *Monsanto Guilty in ‘False Ad’ Row*, BC, Oct. 15, 2009, available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8308903.stm>.

Classifications and Assessments of Glyphosate

42. The IARC process for the classification of glyphosate followed IARC's stringent procedures for the evaluation of a chemical agent. Over time, the IARC Monograph program has reviewed 980 agents. Of those reviewed, it has determined 116 agents to be Group 1 (Known Human Carcinogens); 73 agents to be Group 2A (Probable Human Carcinogens); 287 agents to be Group 2B (Possible Human Carcinogens); 503 agents to be Group 3 (Not Classified); and one agent to be Probably Not Carcinogenic.

43. The established procedure for IARC Monograph evaluations is described in the IARC Programme's Preamble.²⁰ Evaluations are performed by panels of international experts, selected on the basis of their expertise and the absence of actual or apparent conflicts of interest.

44. One year before the Monograph meeting, the meeting is announced and there is a call both for data and for experts. Eight months before the Monograph meeting, the Working Group membership is selected and the sections of the Monograph are developed by the Working Group members. One month prior to the Monograph meeting, the call for data is closed and the various draft sections are distributed among Working Group members for review and comment. Finally, at the Monograph meeting, the Working Group finalizes review of all literature, evaluates the evidence in each category, and completes the overall evaluation. Within two weeks after the Monograph meeting, the summary of the Working Group findings are published in *The Lancet Oncology*, and within a year after the meeting, the finalized Monograph is published.

45. In assessing an agent, the IARC Working Group reviews the following information: (a) human, experimental, and mechanistic data; (b) all pertinent epidemiological

²⁰ World Health Org., *IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to Humans: Preamble* (2006), available at <http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf>.

1 studies and cancer bioassays; and (c) representative mechanistic data. The studies must be
2 publicly available and have sufficient detail for meaningful review, and reviewers cannot be
3 associated with the underlying study.

4 46. In March 2015, IARC reassessed glyphosate. The summary published in *The*
5 *Lancet Oncology* reported that glyphosate is a Group 2A agent and probably carcinogenic in
6 humans.

7 47. On July 29, 2015, IARC issued its Monograph for glyphosate, Monograph
8 Volume 112. For Volume 112, a Working Group of 17 experts from 11 countries met at IARC
9 from March 3–10, 2015 to assess the carcinogenicity of certain herbicides, including glyphosate.
10 The March meeting culminated a nearly one-year review and preparation by the IARC
11 Secretariat and the Working Group, including a comprehensive review of the latest available
12 scientific evidence. According to published procedures, the Working Group considered “reports
13 that have been published or accepted for publication in the openly available scientific literature”
14 as well as “data from governmental reports that are publicly available.”

15 48. The studies considered the following exposure groups: (1) occupational exposure
16 of farmers and tree nursery workers in the United States, forestry workers in Canada and Finland
17 and municipal weed-control workers in the United Kingdom; and (2) para-occupational exposure
18 in farming families.

19 49. Glyphosate was identified as the second-most used household herbicide in the
20 United States for weed control between 2001 and 2007 and the most heavily used herbicide in
21 the world in 2012.

1 50. Exposure pathways are identified as air (especially during spraying), water, and
2 food. Community exposure to glyphosate is widespread and found in soil, air, surface water, and
3 groundwater, as well as in food.

4 51. The assessment of the IARC Working Group identified several case control
5 studies of occupational exposure in the United States, Canada, and Sweden. These studies show
6 a human health concern from agricultural and other work-related exposure to glyphosate.

7 52. The IARC Working Group found an increased risk between exposure to
8 glyphosate and NHL and several subtypes of NHL, and the increased risk persisted after
9 adjustment for other pesticides.

10 53. The IARC Working Group also found that glyphosate caused DNA and
11 chromosomal damage in human cells. One study in community residents reported increases in
12 blood markers of chromosomal damage (micronuclei) after glyphosate formulations were
13 sprayed.

14 54. In male CD-1 mice, glyphosate induced a positive trend in the incidence of a rare
15 tumor: renal tubule carcinoma. A second study reported a positive trend for haemangiosarcoma
16 in male mice. Glyphosate increased pancreatic islet-cell adenoma in male rats in two studies. A
17 glyphosate formulation promoted skin tumors in an initiation-promotion study in mice.

18 55. The IARC Working Group also noted that glyphosate has been detected in the
19 urine of agricultural workers, indicating absorption. Soil microbes degrade glyphosate to
20 aminomethylphosphoric acid (AMPA). Blood AMPA detection after exposure suggests intestinal
21 microbial metabolism in humans.

1 56. The IARC Working Group further found that glyphosate and glyphosate
2 formulations induced DNA and chromosomal damage in mammals, and in human and animal
3 cells in utero.

4 57. The IARC Working Group also noted genotoxic, hormonal, and enzymatic
5 effects in mammals exposed to glyphosate.²¹ Essentially, glyphosate inhibits the biosynthesis of
6 aromatic amino acids, which leads to several metabolic disturbances, including the inhibition of
7 protein and secondary product biosynthesis and general metabolic disruption.

8 58. The IARC Working Group also reviewed an Agricultural Health Study, consisting
9 of a prospective cohort of 57,311 licensed pesticide applicators in Iowa and North Carolina.²²
10 While this study differed from others in that it was based on a self-administered questionnaire,
11 the results support an association between glyphosate exposure and multiple myeloma, hairy cell
12 leukemia (HCL), and chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), in addition to several other cancers.

13 ***Other Earlier Findings About Glyphosate's Dangers to Human Health***

14 59. The EPA has a technical fact sheet, as part of its Drinking Water and Health,
15 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations publication, relating to glyphosate. This technical
16 fact sheet predates IARC's March 20, 2015 evaluation. The fact sheet describes the release
17 patterns for glyphosate as follows:

18 **Release Patterns**

19 Glyphosate is released to the environment in its use as a
20 herbicide for controlling woody and herbaceous weeds on forestry,

21 ²¹ Guyton et al., *Carcinogenicity of Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Diazinon &*
Glyphosate, *supra* at 77.

22 ²² Anneclare J. De Roos et al., *Cancer Incidence Among Glyphosate- Exposed Pesticide*
Applicators in the Agricultural Health Study, 113 *Env'tl Health Perspectives* 49–54 (2005),
23 available at [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1253709/pdf/ehp0113-](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1253709/pdf/ehp0113-000049.pdf)
24 [000049.pdf](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1253709/pdf/ehp0113-000049.pdf).

1 right-of-way, cropped and non-cropped sites. These sites may be
2 around water and in wetlands.

3 It may also be released to the environment during its
4 manufacture, formulation, transport, storage, disposal and
5 cleanup, and from spills. Since glyphosate is not a listed chemical
6 in the Toxics Release Inventory, data on releases during its
7 manufacture and handling are not available.

8 Occupational workers and home gardeners may be exposed
9 to glyphosate by inhalation and dermal contact during spraying,
10 mixing, and cleanup. They may also be exposed by touching soil
11 and plants to which glyphosate was applied. Occupational
12 exposure may also occur during glyphosate's manufacture,
13 transport storage, and disposal. 23

14 60. In 1995, the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides reported that in
15 California, the state with the most comprehensive program for reporting of pesticide-caused
16 illness, glyphosate was the third most commonly-reported cause of pesticide illness among
17 agricultural workers.²⁴

18 *The Toxicity of Other Ingredients in Roundup®*

19 61. In addition to the toxicity of the active ingredient, glyphosate, several studies
20 support the hypothesis that the glyphosate-based formulation in Defendant's Roundup® products
21 is more dangerous and toxic than glyphosate alone. Indeed, as early as 1991, available evidence
22 demonstrated that glyphosate formulations were significantly more toxic than glyphosate
23 alone.²⁵

24 ²³ U.S. Env'tl. Prot. Agency, *Technical Factsheet on: Glyphosate, supra.*

²⁴ Caroline Cox, *Glyphosate, Part 2: Human Exposure and Ecological Effects*, 15 J.
²⁵ PESTICIDE REFORM 4 (1995); W.S. Peas et al., *Preventing pesticide-related illness in
California agriculture: Strategies and priorities. Environmental Health Policy Program Report*,
Univ. of Cal. School of Public Health, Calif. Policy Seminar (1993).

²⁶ 25 Martinez, T.T. and K. Brown, *Oral and pulmonary toxicology of the surfactant used in
Roundup herbicide*, PROC. WEST. PHARMACOL. SOC. 34:43-46 (1991).

1 62. In 2002, a study by Julie Marc, entitled “Pesticide Roundup Provokes Cell
2 Division Dysfunction at the Level of CDK1/Cyclin B Activation,” revealed that Roundup®
3 causes delays in the cell cycles of sea urchins but that the same concentrations of glyphosate
4 alone were ineffective and did not alter cell cycles.²⁶

5 63. A 2004 study by Marc and others, entitled “Glyphosate-based pesticides affect
6 cell cycle regulation,” demonstrated a molecular link between glyphosate-based products and
7 cell cycle dysregulation. The researchers noted that “cell-cycle dysregulation is a hallmark of
8 tumor cells and human cancer. Failure in the cell-cycle checkpoints leads genomic instability
9 and subsequent development of cancers from the initial affected cell.” Further, “[s]ince cell cycle
10 disorders such as cancer result from dysfunction of a unique cell; it was of interest to evaluate
11 the threshold dose of glyphosate affecting the cells.”²⁷

12 64. In 2005, a study by Francisco Peixoto, entitled “Comparative effects of the
13 Roundup and glyphosate on mitochondrial oxidative phosphorylation,” demonstrated that
14 Roundup®’s effects on rat liver mitochondria are far more toxic than equal concentrations of
15 glyphosate alone. The Peixoto study further suggested that the harmful effects of Roundup® on
16 mitochondrial bioenergetics could not be exclusively attributed to glyphosate but could be the

26 Julie Marc, et al., *Pesticide Roundup Provokes Cell Division Dysfunction at the Level of
21 CDK1/Cyclin B Activation*, 15 CHEM. RES. TOXICOL. 326–331
22 (2002), available at <http://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/tx015543g>.

27 Julie Marc, et al., *Glyphosate-based pesticides affect cell cycle
23 regulation*, 96 BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 245, 245-249 (2004), available at
24 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1016/j.biocel.2003.11.010/epdf>.

1 result of other chemicals, such as the surfactant POEA, or in the alternative, due to a potential
2 synergic effect between glyphosate and other ingredients in the Roundup® formulation.²⁸

3 65. In 2009, Nora Benachour and Gilles-Eric Seralini published a study examining
4 the effects of Roundup® and glyphosate on human umbilical, embryonic, and placental cells.
5 The study tested dilution levels of Roundup® and glyphosate that were far below agricultural
6 recommendations, corresponding with low levels of residue in food. The researchers ultimately
7 concluded that supposed “inert” ingredients, and possibly POEA, alter human cell permeability
8 and amplify toxicity of glyphosate alone. The researchers further suggested that assessments of
9 glyphosate toxicity should account for the presence of adjuvants or additional chemicals used in
10 the formulation of the complete pesticide. The study confirmed that the adjuvants present in
11 Roundup® are not, in fact, inert and that Roundup® is potentially far more toxic than its active
12 ingredient glyphosate alone.²⁹

13 66. The results of these studies were at all times available to Defendant. Defendant
14 thus knew or should have known that Roundup® is more toxic than glyphosate alone and that
15 safety studies of Roundup®, Roundup®’s adjuvants and “inert” ingredients, and/or the surfactant
16 POEA were necessary to protect Plaintiff from Roundup®.

17 67. Despite its knowledge that Roundup® is considerably more dangerous than
18 glyphosate alone, Defendant continued to promote Roundup® as safe.

20 ²⁸ Francisco Peixoto, *Comparative effects of the Roundup and glyphosate on mitochondrial*
21 *oxidative phosphorylation*, 61 CHEMOSPHERE 1115, 1122 (2005), available at
22 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7504567_Comparative_effects_of_the_Roundup_and_glyphosate_on_mitochondrial_oxidative_phosphorylation

23 ²⁹ Nora Benachour, et al., *Glyphosate Formulations Induce Apoptosis and Necrosis in Human*
24 *Umbilical, Embryonic, and Placental Cells*, 22 CHEM. RES. TOXICOL. 97-105 (2008),
available at <http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/france.pdf>.

Recent Worldwide Bans on Roundup®/Glyphosate

68. Several countries around the world have instituted bans on the sale of Roundup® and other glyphosate-containing herbicides, both before and since IARC first announced its assessment for glyphosate in March 2015, and more countries undoubtedly will follow suit as the dangers of the use of Roundup® become more widely known. The Netherlands issued a ban on all glyphosate-based herbicides in April 2014, including Roundup®, which took effect at the end of 2016. In issuing the ban, the Dutch Parliament member who introduced the successful legislation stated: “Agricultural pesticides in user-friendly packaging are sold in abundance to private persons. In garden centers, Roundup® is promoted as harmless, but unsuspecting customers have no idea what the risks of this product are. Especially children are sensitive to toxic substances and should therefore not be exposed to it.”³⁰

69. The Brazilian Public Prosecutor in the Federal District requested that the Brazilian Justice Department suspend the use of glyphosate.³¹

70. France banned the private sale of Roundup® and glyphosate following the IARC assessment for Glyphosate.³²

³⁰ *Holland’s Parliament Bans Glyphosate Herbicides*, The Real Agenda, April 14, 2014, available at <http://real-agenda.com/hollands-parliament-bans-glyphosate-herbicides/>.

³¹ Christina Sarich, *Brazil’s Public Prosecutor Wants to Ban Monsanto’s Chemicals Following Recent Glyphosate-Cancer Link*, GLOBAL RESEARCH, May 14, 2015, available at <http://naturalsociety.com/brazils-public-prosecutor-wants-to-ban-monsantos-chemicals/>; see Ministério Público Federal, *MPF/DF reforça pedido para que glifosato seja banido do mercado nacional*, April, 14, 2015, available at http://noticias.pgr.mpf.mp.br/noticias/noticias-do-site/copy_of_meio-ambiente-e-patrimonio-cultural/mpf-df-reforca-pedido-para-que-glifosato-seja-banido-do-mercado-nacional.

³² Zoe Schlanger, *France Bans Sales of Monsanto’s Roundup in Garden Centers, 3 Months After U.N. Calls it ‘Probable Carcinogen’*, NEWSWEEK, June 15, 2015, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/france-bans-sale-monsantos-roundup-garden-centers-after-un-names-it-probable-343311>.

1 71. Bermuda banned both the private and commercial sale of glyphosates, including
2 Roundup®. The Bermuda government explained its ban as follows: “Following a recent
3 scientific study carried out by a leading cancer agency, the importation of weed spray ‘Roundup’
4 has been suspended.”³³

5 72. The Sri Lankan government banned the private and commercial use of
6 glyphosate, particularly out of concern that glyphosate has been linked to fatal kidney disease in
7 agricultural workers.³⁴

8 73. The government of Colombia announced its ban on using Roundup® and
9 glyphosate to destroy illegal plantations of coca, the raw ingredient for cocaine, because of the
10 WHO’s finding that glyphosate is probably carcinogenic.³⁵

11 ***Proposition 65 Listing***

12 74. On September 4, 2015, California’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard
13 Assessment (“OEHHA”) published a notice of intent to include glyphosate on the state’s list of
14 known carcinogens under Proposition 65.³⁶ California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
15 Enforcement Act of 1986 (informally known as “Proposition 65”), requires the state to maintain
16 and, at least once a year, revise and republish a list of chemicals “known to the State of
17
18

19 ³³ *Health Minister: Importation of Roundup Weed Spray Suspended*, Today in Bermuda, May,
11 2015, available at <http://bernews.com/2015/05/importation-weed-spray-round-suspended/>

20 ³⁴ *Sri Lanka’s New President Puts Immediate Ban on Glyphosate Herbicides*, Sustainable Pulse,
May 25, 2015, available at <http://sustainablepulse.com/2015/05/25/sri-lankas-new-president-puts-immediate-ban-on-glyphosate-herbicides/#.VeduYk3bKAw>.

21 ³⁵ *Columbia to ban coca spraying herbicide glyphosate*, BBC, May 10, 2015, available at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32677411>.

22 ³⁶ Cal. Env’tl. Prot. Agency Office of Env’tl. Health Hazard Assessment, Notice of Intent to List
23 Chemicals by the Labor Code Mechanism: Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion, Glyphosate
(Sept. 4, 2015), <https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65/crnrr/notice-intent-list-tetrachlorvinphos-parathion-malathion-glyphosate>

1 California to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity.”³⁷ The OEHHA determined that glyphosate
2 met the criteria for the listing mechanism under the Labor Code following IARC’s assessment of
3 the chemical.³⁸

4 75. The listing process under the Labor Code is essentially automatic. The list of
5 known carcinogens, at a minimum, must include substances identified by reference in Labor
6 Code § 6382(b)(1). That section of the Labor Code identifies “[s]ubstances listed as human or
7 animal carcinogens by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC).” IARC’s
8 classification of glyphosate as a Group 2A chemical (“probably carcinogenic to humans”)
9 therefore triggered the listing.

10 76. A business that deploys a listed chemical in its products must provide “clear and
11 reasonable warnings” to the public prior to exposure to the chemical. To be clear and reasonable,
12 a warning must “(1) clearly communicate that the chemical is known to cause cancer, and/or
13 birth defects or other reproductive harm; and (2) effectively reach the person before
14 exposure.”³⁹ The law also prohibits the discharge of listed chemicals into drinking water.

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16
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18
19 ³⁷ *Frequently Asked Questions*, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, <http://oag.ca.gov/prop65/faq> (last visited April 19, 2016).

21 ³⁸ Cal. Env’tl. Prot. Agency Office of Env’tl. Health Hazard Assessment, Notice of Intent to
22 List Chemicals by the Labor Code Mechanism: Tetrachlorvinphos, Parathion, Malathion,
Glyphosate (Sept. 4, 2015), <https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65/cmr/notice-intent-list-tetrachlorvinphos-parathion-malathion-glyphosate>

23 ³⁹ *Frequently Asked Questions*, STATE OF CAL. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
24 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, *supra*.

1 77. Monsanto disputed the listing decision and, in January 2016, filed a lawsuit
2 against OEHHA and the agency's acting director, Lauren Zeise, in California state court, seeking
3 declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent OEHHA from listing glyphosate.⁴⁰

4 78. Monsanto alleged that OEHHA's exclusive reliance on the IARC decision
5 signified that "OEHHA effectively elevated the determination of an ad hoc committee of an
6 unelected, foreign body, which answers to no United States official (let alone any California state
7 official), over the conclusions of its own scientific experts."⁴¹ Monsanto further alleged that the
8 Labor Code listing mechanism presented various constitutional violations because it "effectively
9 empowers an unelected, undemocratic, unaccountable, and foreign body to make laws applicable
10 in California."⁴² Among other things, Monsanto argued that Proposition 65's requirement to
11 provide a "clear and reasonable warning" to consumers that the chemical is a known carcinogen
12 would damage its reputation and violate its First Amendment rights.⁴³

13 79. The case remains pending.

14 ***EFSA Report on Glyphosate***

15 80. On November 12, 2015, the European Food Safety Authority ("EFSA"), the
16 European Union's primary agency for food safety, reported on its evaluation of the Renewal
17 Assessment Report ("RAR") on glyphosate.⁴⁴ The Rapporteur Member State assigned to

18
19 40 Monsanto Company's Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Preliminary
20 and Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, *Monsanto Co. v. Office of the Env'tl Health
Hazard Assessment, et al.*, No. 16- CECG-00183 (Cal. Super. Ct.) *available at*

21 <http://www.monsanto.com/files/documents/monvoehha.pdf>.

22 41 *Id.* at 2.

23 42 *Id.* at 3.

24 43 *Id.*

44 European Food Safety Auth., Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment
of the active substance glyphosate, *available at*

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/scientific_output/files/main_documents/4302.pdf.

1 glyphosate, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (“BfR”), had produced the RAR
2 as part of the renewal process for glyphosate in the EU.

3 81. BfR sent its draft RAR to EFSA and the RAR underwent a peer review process
4 by EFSA, other member states, and industry groups. As part of the on-going peer review of
5 Germany’s reevaluation of glyphosate, EFSA had also received a second mandate from the
6 European Commission to consider IARC’s findings regarding the potential carcinogenicity of
7 glyphosate and glyphosate-containing products.

8 82. Based on a review of the RAR, which included data from industry- submitted
9 unpublished studies, EFSA sent its own report (“Conclusion”) to the European Commission,
10 finding that “glyphosate is unlikely to pose a carcinogenic hazard to humans and the evidence
11 does not support classification with regard to its carcinogenic potential according to Regulation
12 (EC) No 1272/2008.”⁴⁵ EFSA therefore disagreed with IARC: glyphosate was not genotoxic
13 and did not present a carcinogenic threat to humans.

14 83. In explaining why its results departed from IARC’s conclusion, EFSA drew a
15 distinction between the EU and IARC approaches to the study and classification of chemicals.⁴⁶
16 Although IARC examined “both glyphosate -- an active substance -- and glyphosate-based
17 formulations, grouping all formulations regardless of their composition,” EFSA explained that it
18 considered only glyphosate and that its assessment focuses on “each individual chemical, and
19 each marketed mixture separately.”⁴⁷ IARC, on the other hand, “assesses generic agents,
20 including groups of related chemicals, as well as occupational or environmental exposure, and

21 _____
22 ⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ EFSA Fact Sheet: Glyphosate, EFSA

⁴⁷ http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/corporate_publications/files/efsaexplainsglyphosate151112en.pdf.

24 ⁴⁷ *Id.*

1 cultural or behavioral practices.”⁴⁸ EFSA accorded greater weight to studies conducted with
2 glyphosate alone than studies of formulated products.⁴⁹

3 84. EFSA went further and noted:

4 [A]lthough some studies suggest that certain glyphosate-based
5 formulations may be genotoxic (i.e. damaging to DNA), others
6 that look solely at the active substance glyphosate do not show this
7 effect. It is likely, therefore, that *the genotoxic effects observed in
8 some glyphosate-based formulations are related to the other
9 constituents or “co-formulants”*. Similarly, certain glyphosate-
10 based formulations display higher toxicity than that of the active
11 ingredient, presumably because of the presence of co-formulants.
12 In its assessment, *EFSA proposes that the toxicity of each
13 pesticide formulation and in particular its genotoxic potential
14 should be further considered and addressed by Member State
15 authorities while they re-assess uses of glyphosate-based
16 formulations in their own territories.*⁵⁰

17 85. Notwithstanding its conclusion, EFSA did set exposure levels for glyphosate.
18 Specifically, EFSA proposed an acceptable daily intake (ADI) of 0.5 mg/kg of body weight per
19 day; an acute reference dose (ARfD) of 0.5 mg/kg of body weight; and an acceptable operator
20 exposure level (AOEL) of 0.1 mg/kg bw per day.⁵¹

21 *Leading Scientists Dispute EFSA’s Conclusion*

22 86. On November 27, 2015, 96 independent academic and governmental scientists
23 from around the world submitted an open letter to the EU health commissioner, Vytenis
24 Andriukaitis.⁵² The scientists expressed their strong concerns and urged the commissioner to

25 ⁴⁸ *Id.*

26 ⁴⁹ *Id.*

27 ⁵⁰ *Id.*

28 ⁵¹ European Food Safety Auth., Conclusion on the peer review of the pesticide risk assessment
29 of the active substance glyphosate, *supra*.

30 ⁵² Letter from Christopher J. Portier et al. to Commission Vytenis Andriukaitis, Open letter:
31 Review of the Carcinogenicity of Glyphosate by EFSA and BfR (Nov. 27, 2015),
32 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Prof_Portier_letter.pdf

1 disregard the “flawed” EFSA report, arguing that “the BfR decision is not credible because it is
2 not supported by the evidence and it was not reached in an open and transparent manner.”⁵³

3 87. Signatories to the letter included Dr. Christopher J. Portier, Ph.D., and other
4 renowned international experts in the field, some of whom were part of the IARC Working
5 Group assigned to glyphosate.

6 88. In an exhaustive and careful examination, the scientists scrutinized EFSA’s
7 conclusions and outlined why the IARC Working Group decision was “by far the more
8 credible”:

9 The IARC WG decision was reached relying on open and
10 transparent procedures by independent scientists who completed
11 thorough conflict-of-interest statements and were not affiliated or
12 financially supported in any way by the chemical manufacturing
13 industry. It is fully referenced and depends entirely on reports
14 published in the open, peer-reviewed biomedical literature. It is
15 part of a long tradition of deeply researched and highly credible
16 reports on the carcinogenicity of hundreds of chemicals issued
17 over the past four decades by IARC and used today by
18 international agencies and regulatory bodies around the world as a
19 basis for risk assessment, regulation and public health policy.⁵⁴

20 89. With respect to human data, the scientists pointed out that EFSA agreed with
21 IARC that there was “*limited evidence* of carcinogenicity” for non- Hodgkin lymphoma, but
22 EFSA nonetheless dismissed an association between glyphosate exposure and carcinogenicity.
23 IARC applies three levels of evidence in its analyses of human data, including sufficient
24 evidence and limited evidence. EFSA’s ultimate conclusion that “there was no unequivocal
evidence for a clear and strong association of NHL with glyphosate” was misleading because it
was tantamount to IARC’s highest level of evidence: “sufficient evidence,” which means that a

53 *Id.*

54 *Id.*

1 causal relationship has been established. However, the scientists argued, “[l]egitimate public
2 health concerns arise when ‘causality is credible,’ i.e., when there is *limited evidence*.” 55

3 90. Among its many other deficiencies, EFSA’s conclusions regarding animal
4 carcinogenicity data were “scientifically unacceptable,” particularly in BfR’s use of historical
5 control data and in its trend analysis. Indeed, BfR’s analysis directly contradicted the
6 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) testing guidelines while
7 citing and purporting to follow those same guidelines. For instance, the EFSA report dismisses
8 observed trends in tumor incidence “because there are no individual treatment groups that are
9 significantly different from controls and because the maximum observed response is reportedly
10 within the range of the historical control data.” However, according to the scientists, concurrent
11 controls are recommended over historical controls in all guidelines, scientific reports, and
12 publications, and, if it is employed, historical control data “should be from studies in the same
13 timeframe, for the same exact animal strain, preferably from the same laboratory or the same
14 supplier and preferably reviewed by the same pathologist.” BfR’s use of historical control data
15 violated these precautions: “only a single study used the same mouse strain as the historical
16 controls but was reported more than 10 years after the historical control dataset was developed.”
17 Further deviating from sound scientific practices, the data used by the BfR came from studies in
18 seven different laboratories. The scientists concluded:

19 BfR reported seven positive mouse studies with three studies
20 showing increases in renal tumors, two with positive findings for
21 hemangiosarcomas, and two with positive findings for malignant
22 lymphomas. BfR additionally reported two positive findings for
tumors in rats. Eliminating the inappropriate use of historical data
the unequivocal conclusion is that these are not negative studies,

23 _____
24 *55 Id.*

1 but in fact document the carcinogenicity of glyphosate in
2 laboratory animals.⁵⁶

3 91. The letter also critiqued the EFSA report's lack of transparency and the opacity
4 surrounding the data cited in the report: "citations for almost all of the references, even those
5 from the open scientific literature, have been redacted from the document" and "there are no
6 authors or contributors listed for either document, a requirement for publication in virtually all
7 scientific journals." Because BfR relied on unpublished, confidential industry-provided studies,
8 it is "impossible for any scientist not associated with BfR to review this conclusion with
9 scientific confidence."⁵⁷

10 92. On March 3, 2016, the letter was published in the Journal of Epidemiology &
11 Community Health.⁵⁸

12 ***Statement of Concern Regarding Glyphosate-Based Herbicides***

13 93. On February 17, 2016, a consensus statement published in the journal
14 *Environmental Health*, entitled "Concerns over use of glyphosate-based herbicides and risks
15 associated with exposures: a consensus statement," assessed the safety of glyphosate-based
16 herbicides (GBHs).⁵⁹ The paper's "focus is on the unanticipated effects arising from the
17 worldwide increase in use of GBHs, coupled with recent discoveries about the toxicity and
18

19 ⁵⁶ *Id.*

20 ⁵⁷ *Id.*

21 ⁵⁸ Christopher J. Portier, et al., *Differences in the carcinogenic evaluation of glyphosate*
22 *between the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the European Food*
Safety Authority (EFSA), JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH, Mar. 3, 2016,
available at <http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2016/03/03/jech-2015-207005.full>.

23 ⁵⁹ John P. Myers, et al, *Concerns over use of glyphosate-based herbicides and risks associated*
24 *with exposures: a consensus statement*, Environmental Health (2016), available at
<http://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12940-016-0117-0>.

1 human health risks stemming from use of GBHs.”⁶⁰ The researchers drew seven factual
2 conclusions about GBHs:

- 3 1. GBHs are the most heavily applied herbicide in the world and usage continues
4 to rise;
- 5 2. Worldwide, GBHs often contaminate drinking water sources, precipitation,
6 and air, especially in agricultural regions;
- 7 3. The half-life of glyphosate in water and soil is longer than previously
8 recognized;
- 9 4. Glyphosate and its metabolites are widely present in the global soybean
10 supply;
- 11 5. Human exposures to GBHs are rising;
- 12 6. Glyphosate is now authoritatively classified as a probable human carcinogen;
and
- 13 7. Regulatory estimates of tolerable daily intakes for glyphosate in the United
14 States and European Union are based on outdated science. ⁶¹

15 94. The researchers noted that GBH use has increased approximately 100-fold since
16 the 1970s. Further, far from posing a limited hazard to vertebrates, as previously believed, two
17 decades of evidence demonstrated that “several vertebrate pathways are likely targets of action,
18 including hepatorenal damage, effects on nutrient balance through glyphosate chelating action
19 and endocrine disruption.”⁶²

20 95. The paper attributes uncertainties in current assessments of glyphosate
21 formulations to the fact that “[t]he full list of chemicals in most commercial GBHs is protected
22 as ‘commercial business information,’ despite the universally accepted relevance of such
23 information to scientists hoping to conduct an accurate risk assessment of these herbicide
24

60 *Id.*

61 *Id.*

62 *Id.*

1 formulations.” Further, the researchers argue, “[t]he distinction in regulatory review and decision
 2 processes between ‘active’ and ‘inert’ ingredients has no toxicological justification, given
 3 increasing evidence that several so-called ‘inert’ adjuvants are toxic in their own right.”⁶³

4 96. Among various implications, the researchers conclude that “existing toxicological
 5 data and risk assessments are not sufficient to infer that GBHs, as currently used, are safe.”
 6 Further, “GBH-product formulations are more potent, or toxic, than glyphosate alone to a wide
 7 array of non-target organisms including mammals, aquatic insects, and fish.” Accordingly, “risk
 8 assessments of GBHs that are based on studies quantifying the impacts of glyphosate alone
 9 underestimate both toxicity and exposure, and thus risk.” The paper concludes that this
 10 “shortcoming has repeatedly led regulators to set inappropriately high exposure thresholds.”⁶⁴

11 97. The researchers also critique the current practice of regulators who largely rely on
 12 “unpublished, non-peer reviewed data generated by the registrants” but ignore “published
 13 research because it often uses standards and procedures to assess quality that are different from
 14 those codified in regulatory agency data requirements, which largely focus on avoiding fraud.”
 15 In the researchers’ view, “[s]cientists independent of the registrants should conduct regulatory
 16 tests of GBHs that include glyphosate alone, as well as GBH-product formulations.”⁶⁵

17 98. The researchers also call for greater inclusion of GBHs in government-led
 18 toxicology testing programs:

19 [A] fresh and independent examination of GBH toxicity should
 20 be undertaken, and . . . this re-examination be accompanied
 21 by systematic efforts by relevant agencies to monitor GBH levels
 22 in people and in the food supply, none of which are
 occurring today. The U.S. National Toxicology Program
 should prioritize a thorough toxicological assessment of the

23 ⁶³ *Id.*

⁶⁴ *Id.*

24 ⁶⁵ *Id.*

1 multiple pathways now identified as potentially vulnerable to
2 GBHs.⁶⁶

3 99. The researchers suggest that, in order to fill the gap created by an absence of
4 government funds to support research on GBHs, regulators could adopt a system through which
5 manufacturers fund the registration process and the necessary testing:

6 “[W]e recommend that a system be put in place through which
7 manufacturers of GBHs provide funds to the appropriate regulatory
8 body as part of routine registration actions and fees. Such funds
9 should then be transferred to appropriate government research
10 institutes, or to an agency experienced in the award of competitive
11 grants. In either case, funds would be made available to
12 independent scientists to conduct the appropriate long-term
13 (minimum 2 years) safety studies in recognized animal model
14 systems. A thorough and modern assessment of GBH toxicity will
15 encompass potential endocrine disruption, impacts on the gut
16 microbiome, carcinogenicity, and multigenerational effects looking
17 at reproductive capability and frequency of birth defects.”⁶⁷

12 *EU Vote on Glyphosate Renewal*

13 100. The license for glyphosate in the European Union (EU) was set to expire on June
14 30, 2016.

15 101. Without an extension of the license, Monsanto’s Roundup® and other glyphosate-
16 based herbicides faced a general phase out in EU markets.⁶⁸

17 102. In the months leading up to the license expiration date, protracted meetings and
18 votes among national experts from the 28 EU Member States failed to produce agreement on an
19 extension.

21 _____
22 ⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.*

23 ⁶⁸ Philip Blenkinsop, Alissa de Carbonnel & Barbara Lewis, *European Commission to extend*
24 *glyphosate license for 18 months*, REUTERS, June 28, 2016, available at
<http://www.sej.org/headlines/european-commission-extend-glyphosate-license-18-months>

1 103. For instance, on March 4, 2016, *The Guardian* reported that France, the
2 Netherlands, and Sweden did not support EFSA's assessment that glyphosate was harmless.⁶⁹
3 The paper quoted the Swedish environment minister, Åsa Romson, as stating: "We won't take
4 risks with glyphosate and we don't think that the analysis done so far is good enough. We will
5 propose that no decision is taken until further analysis has been done and the EFSA scientists
6 have been more transparent about their considerations."⁷⁰

7 104. The Netherlands argued that relicensing should be placed on hold until after a
8 separate evaluation of glyphosate's toxicity can be conducted.⁷¹ Leading up to the vote, Italy
9 joined the other EU states in opposing the license renewal, citing health concerns.⁷²

10 105. On June 6, 2016, Member States voted but failed to reach a qualified majority in
11 favor or against the re-authorization of glyphosate.⁷³

12 106. On June 29, 2016, the EU Commission extended the European license for
13 glyphosate for 18 months to allow the European Chemical Agency to rule on the safety of the
14 chemical, which is expected by the end of 2017.⁷⁴

16 69 Arthur Neslen, *EU states rebel against plans to relicense weedkiller glyphosate*, THE
17 GUARDIAN, Mar. 4, 2016, available at
18 <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/04/eu-states-rebel-against-plans-to-relicense-weedkiller-glyphosate>.

19 70 *Id.*

20 71 Arthur Neslen, *Vote on Controversial weedkiller's European licence postponed*, THE
21 GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2016, available at
22 <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/08/eu-vote-on-controversial-weedkiller-licence-postponed-glyphosate>.

23 72 *Id.*

24 73 Manon Flausch, *Commission prolongs glyphosate license by 18 months*, EURACTIV,
25 June 29, 2016, available at <http://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/commission-prolongs-glyphosate-licence-by-18-months/>

26 74 Arthur Neslen, *Controversial chemical in Roundup weedkiller escapes immediate ban*, THE
27 GUARDIAN, June 29, 2016, available at

1 107. On July 11, 2016, the EU voted in favor of a proposal to restrict the conditions of
2 use of glyphosate in the EU, including a ban on common co-formulant POE-tallowamine
3 (“POEA”) from all glyphosate-based herbicides, including Roundup®.⁷⁵

4 108. These restrictions, which are non-binding on the EU states, are expected to apply
5 until the European Chemicals Agency issues an opinion on the chemical's safety.⁷⁶

6 ***Plaintiff’s Exposure to Roundup®***

7 109. Plaintiff Brandy Rhodes is 43 years of age and lives in Vancouver, Washington.

8 110. Roundup® was routinely applied to the city parks by City employees near Ms.
9 Rhodes’ residence at 880 Aspen Avenue, La Center, Washington. From 2000 through part of
10 2005, Ms. Rhodes frequently visited the city parks with her children and on her daily runs. Ms.
11 Rhodes thereafter moved to 1602 E. 4th Way, La Center, Washington in the Summer of 2005 and
12 was exposed to Roundup® that was being sprayed at the city park near her residence. Ms.
13 Rhodes was exposed to Roundup® while walking in parks and where she frequently went for
14 runs. Ms. Rhodes resided in La Center until late Summer of 2008.

15 111. In or about December, 2005, Plaintiff Brandy Rhodes was diagnosed with Stage
16 IIA Nodular Sclerosing Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma by Dr. Christine Katterhagen. She
17 underwent several cycles of chemotherapy and radiation.

18 112. During the entire time that Ms. Rhodes was exposed to Roundup®, she did not
19 know that exposure to Roundup® was injurious to her health or the health of others.

20
21 [https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/29/controversial-chemical-roundup-weedkiller-
escapes-immediate-ban](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/29/controversial-chemical-roundup-weedkiller-escapes-immediate-ban)

22 75 Sarantis Michalopoulos, *EU agrees ban on glyphosate co-formulant*, EURACTIV, July 11,
2016, available at [https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-agrees-ban-on-
glyphosate-co-formulant/](https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/eu-agrees-ban-on-glyphosate-co-formulant/)

23 76 See Arthur Neslen, *Controversial chemical in Roundup weedkiller escapes immediate ban*,
THE GUARDIAN, June 29, 2016.

1 113. Ms. Rhodes first learned that exposure to Roundup® can cause non-Hodgkin
2 lymphoma and other serious illnesses in January 2019, less than three months before filing this
3 Complaint.

4 **TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS**

5 ***Discovery Rule Tolling***

6 114. Plaintiff had no way of knowing about the risk of serious illness associated with
7 the use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate until well-after IARC released its
8 formal assessment of glyphosate in July 2015.

9 115. Within the time period of any applicable statutes of limitations, Plaintiff could not
10 have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that exposure to Roundup® and
11 glyphosate is injurious to human health.

12 116. Plaintiff did not discover and did not know of facts that would cause a reasonable
13 person to suspect, the risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and
14 glyphosate; nor would a reasonable and diligent investigation by her have disclosed that
15 Roundup® and glyphosate would cause her illness.

16 117. For these reasons, all applicable statutes of limitations have been tolled by
17 operation of the discovery rule with respect to Plaintiff's claims.

18 ***Fraudulent Concealment Tolling***

19 118. All applicable statutes of limitations have also been tolled by Monsanto's
20 knowing and active fraudulent concealment and denial of the facts alleged herein throughout the
21 time period relevant to this action.

22 119. Instead of disclosing critical safety information about Roundup® and glyphosate,
23 Monsanto has consistently and falsely represented the safety of its Roundup® products.

Estoppel

120. Monsanto was under a continuous duty to disclose to consumers, users and other persons coming into contact with its products, including Plaintiff, accurate safety information concerning its products and the risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate.

121. Instead, Monsanto knowingly, affirmatively, and actively concealed safety information concerning Roundup® and glyphosate and the serious risks associated with the use of and/or exposure to its products.

122. Based on the foregoing, Monsanto is estopped from relying on any statutes of limitations in defense of this action.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT ONE

STRICT LIABILITY (DESIGN DEFECT)

123. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation set-forth in the preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein, and further state and allege as follows.

124. Plaintiff brings this strict liability claim against Defendant for defective design.

125. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant engaged in the business of testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting Roundup® products, which are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers and users and other persons coming into contact them, including Plaintiff, thereby placing Roundup® products into the stream of commerce. These actions were under the ultimate control and supervision of Defendant. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant designed, researched, developed, formulated, manufactured, produced, tested, assembled, labeled, advertised,

1 promoted, marketed, sold, and distributed the Roundup® products used by Plaintiff, and/or to
2 which Plaintiff was exposed, as described above.

3 126. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant's Roundup® products were
4 manufactured, designed, and labeled in an unsafe, defective, and inherently dangerous manner
5 that was dangerous for use by or exposure to the public, and, in particular, the Plaintiff.

6 127. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant's Roundup® products reached
7 the intended consumers, handlers, and users or other persons coming into contact with these
8 products in Iowa and throughout the United States, including Plaintiff, without substantial
9 change in their condition as designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, labeled, and marketed by
10 Defendant.

11 128. Defendant's Roundup® products, as researched, tested, developed, designed,
12 licensed, formulated, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, sold, and marketed by
13 Defendant were defective in design and formulation in that when they left the hands of the
14 Defendant's manufacturers and/or suppliers, they were unreasonably dangerous and dangerous to
15 an extent beyond that which an ordinary consumer would contemplate.

16 129. Defendant's Roundup® products, as researched, tested, developed, designed,
17 licensed, formulated, manufactured, packaged, labeled, distributed, sold, and marketed by
18 Defendant were defective in design and formulation in that when they left the hands of
19 Defendant's manufacturers and/or suppliers, the foreseeable risks associated with these products'
20 reasonably foreseeable uses exceeded the alleged benefits associated with their design and
21 formulation.

22 130. Therefore, at all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant's Roundup® products,
23 as researched, tested, developed, designed, licensed, manufactured, packaged, labeled,
24

1 distributed, sold and marketed by Defendant, were defective in design and formulation, in one or
2 more of the following ways:

3 a. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendant's Roundup® products
4 were defective in design and formulation, and, consequently, dangerous to an extent
5 beyond that which an ordinary consumer would contemplate.

6 b. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendant's Roundup® products
7 were unreasonably dangerous in that they were hazardous and posed a grave risk of
8 cancer and other serious illnesses when used in a reasonably anticipated manner.

9 c. When placed in the stream of commerce, Defendant's Roundup® products
10 contained unreasonably dangerous design defects and were not reasonably safe when
11 used in a reasonably anticipated or intended manner.

12 d. Defendant did not sufficiently test, investigate, or study its Roundup®
13 products and, specifically, the active ingredient glyphosate.

14 e. Exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products presents a risk
15 of harmful side effects that outweighs any potential utility stemming from the use of the
16 herbicide.

17 f. Defendant knew or should have known at the time of marketing its
18 Roundup® products that exposure to Roundup® and specifically, its active ingredient
19 glyphosate, could result in cancer and other severe illnesses and injuries.

20 g. Defendant did not conduct adequate post-marketing surveillance of its
21 Roundup® products.

22 h. Defendant could have employed safer alternative designs and
23 formulations.

1 131. At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff used and/or was exposed to the use
2 of Defendant's Roundup® products in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner without
3 knowledge of their dangerous characteristics.

4 132. Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the defects and risks associated
5 with Roundup® or glyphosate-containing products before or at the time of exposure.

6 133. The harm caused by Defendant's Roundup® products far outweighed their
7 benefit, rendering Defendant's products dangerous to an extent beyond that which an ordinary
8 consumer would contemplate. Defendant's Roundup® products were and are more dangerous
9 than alternative products and Defendant could have designed its Roundup® products to make
10 them less dangerous. Indeed, at the time that Defendant designed its Roundup® products, the
11 state of the industry's scientific knowledge was such that a less risky design or formulation was
12 attainable.

13 134. At the time Roundup® products left Defendant's control, there was a practical,
14 technically feasible, and safer alternative design that would have prevented the harm without
15 substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of Defendant's
16 Roundup® herbicides.

17 135. Defendant's defective design of Roundup® amounts to willful, wanton, and/or
18 reckless conduct by Defendant.

19 136. Therefore, as a result of the unreasonably dangerous condition of its Roundup®
20 products, Defendant is strictly liable to Plaintiff.

21 137. The defects in Defendant's Roundup® products were substantial and contributing
22 factors in causing Plaintiff's grave injuries, and, but for Defendant's misconduct and omissions,
23 Plaintiff would not have sustained her injuries.

1 138. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant placing its defective Roundup®
2 products into the stream of commerce, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer grave
3 injuries, and has endured pain and discomfort, as well as economic hardship, including
4 considerable financial expenses for medical care and treatment. Plaintiff will continue to incur
5 these expenses in the future.

6 139. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in
7 Plaintiff's favor for compensatory and other damages, together with interest, costs herein
8 incurred, attorneys' fees, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
9 Plaintiff also demands a jury trial on the issues contained herein.

10 **COUNT TWO**

11 **STRICT LIABILITY (FAILURE TO WARN)**

12 140. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the
13 preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein, and further state and allege as follows.

14 141. Plaintiff brings this strict liability claim against Defendant for failure to warn.

15 142. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant engaged in the business of
16 testing, developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, distributing, and promoting
17 Roundup® products, which are defective and unreasonably dangerous to consumers, including
18 Plaintiff, because they do not contain adequate warnings or instructions concerning the
19 dangerous characteristics of Roundup® and specifically, the active ingredient glyphosate. These
20 actions were under the ultimate control and supervision of Defendant.

21 143. Defendant researched, developed, designed, tested, manufactured, inspected,
22 labeled, distributed, marketed, promoted, sold, and otherwise released into the stream of
23 commerce its Roundup® products, and in the course of same, directly advertised or marketed the

1 products to consumers and end users, including Plaintiff, and persons responsible for consumers
2 (such as applicators of Roundup® in public venues), and Defendant therefore had a duty to warn
3 of the risks associated with the reasonably foreseeable uses (and misuses) of Roundup® and
4 glyphosate-containing products.

5 144. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant had a duty to properly test,
6 develop, design, manufacture, inspect, package, label, market, promote, sell, distribute, maintain
7 supply, provide proper warnings, and take such steps as necessary to ensure that its Roundup®
8 products did not cause users and consumers to suffer from unreasonable and dangerous risks.
9 Defendant had a continuing duty to warn Plaintiff of the dangers associated with Roundup® use
10 and exposure. Defendant, as manufacturer, seller, or distributor of chemical herbicides, is held to
11 the knowledge of an expert in the field.

12 145. At the time of manufacture, Defendant could have provided warnings or
13 instructions regarding the full and complete risks of Roundup® and glyphosate-containing
14 products because it knew or should have known of the unreasonable risks of harm associated
15 with the use of and/or exposure to these products.

16 146. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant failed to investigate, study, test,
17 or promote the safety or to minimize the dangers to users and consumers of its Roundup®
18 products and to those who would foreseeably use or be harmed by Defendant's herbicides,
19 including Plaintiff.

20 147. Despite the fact that Defendant knew or should have known that Roundup®
21 products posed a grave risk of harm, it failed to warn of the dangerous risks associated with their
22 use and exposure. The dangerous propensities of its products and the carcinogenic characteristics
23 of glyphosate, as described above, were known to Defendant, or scientifically knowable to
24

1 Defendant through appropriate research and testing by known methods, at the time it distributed,
2 supplied, or sold the product, and not known to end users and consumers, such as Plaintiff and/or
3 applicators of Roundup® in public venues.

4 148. Defendant knew or should have known that its Roundup® and glyphosate-
5 containing products created significant risks of serious bodily harm to consumers, as alleged
6 herein, and Defendant failed to adequately warn consumers and reasonably foreseeable users of
7 the risks of exposure to these products. Defendant has wrongfully concealed information
8 concerning the dangerous nature of Roundup® and its active ingredient glyphosate, and further
9 made false and/or misleading statements concerning the safety of Roundup® and glyphosate.

10 149. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant's Roundup® products reached
11 the intended consumers, handlers, and users or other persons coming into contact with these
12 products throughout the United States, including Plaintiff, without substantial change in their
13 condition as designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, labeled, and marketed by Defendant.

14 150. At all times relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff used and/or was exposed to the use
15 of Defendant's Roundup® products in their intended or reasonably foreseeable manner without
16 knowledge of their dangerous characteristics.

17 151. Plaintiff could not have reasonably discovered the defects and risks associated
18 with Roundup® or glyphosate-containing products before or at the time of Plaintiff's exposure.
19 Plaintiff relied upon the skill, superior knowledge, and judgment of Defendant.

20 152. Defendant knew or should have known that the minimal warnings disseminated
21 with its Roundup® products were inadequate, but it failed to communicate adequate information
22 on the dangers and safe use/exposure and failed to communicate warnings and instructions that
23

1 were appropriate and adequate to render the products safe for their ordinary, intended, and
2 reasonably foreseeable uses, including agricultural and horticultural applications.

3 153. The information that Defendant did provide or communicate failed to contain
4 relevant warnings, hazards, and precautions that would have enabled agricultural workers,
5 horticultural workers and/or at-home users such as Plaintiff to utilize the products safely and
6 with adequate protection. Instead, Defendant disseminated information that was inaccurate, false,
7 and misleading and which failed to communicate accurately or adequately the comparative
8 severity, duration, and extent of the risk of injuries associated with use of and/or exposure to
9 Roundup® and glyphosate; continued to aggressively promote the efficacy of its products, even
10 after it knew or should have known of the unreasonable risks from use or exposure; and
11 concealed, downplayed, or otherwise suppressed, through aggressive marketing and promotion,
12 any information or research about the risks and dangers of exposure to Roundup® and
13 glyphosate.

14 154. To this day, Defendant has failed to adequately and accurately warn of the true
15 risks of Plaintiff's injuries associated with the use of and exposure to Roundup® and its active
16 ingredient glyphosate, a probable carcinogen.

17 155. As a result of their inadequate warnings, Defendant's Roundup® products were
18 defective and unreasonably dangerous when they left the possession and/or control of Defendant,
19 were distributed by Defendant, and used by Plaintiff.

20 156. Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for injuries caused by its failure, as described
21 above, to provide adequate warnings or other clinically relevant information and data regarding
22 the appropriate use of its Roundup® products and the risks associated with the use of or
23 exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate.

1 157. The defects in Defendant's Roundup® products were substantial and contributing
2 factors in causing Plaintiff's injuries, and, but for Defendant's misconduct and omissions,
3 Plaintiff would not have sustained her injuries.

4 158. Had Defendant provided adequate warnings and instructions and properly
5 disclosed and disseminated the risks associated with its Roundup® products, Plaintiff could have
6 avoided the risk of developing injuries as alleged herein and Plaintiff, and applicators of
7 Roundup®, could have obtained alternative herbicides.

8 159. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant placing its defective Roundup®
9 products into the stream of commerce, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer severe
10 injuries, and has endured physical pain and discomfort, as well as economic hardship, including
11 considerable financial expenses for medical care and treatment. Plaintiff will continue to incur
12 these expenses in the future.

13 160. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in
14 Plaintiff's favor for compensatory and other damages, together with interest, costs herein
15 incurred, attorneys' fees, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
16 Plaintiff also demands a jury trial on the issues contained herein.

17 **COUNT THREE**

18 **NEGLIGENCE**

19 161. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the
20 preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein, and further state and allege as follows.

21 162. Defendant, directly or indirectly, caused Roundup® products to be sold,
22 distributed, packaged, labeled, marketed, promoted, and/or used by Plaintiff.

1 163. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable
2 care in the design, research, manufacture, marketing, advertisement, supply, promotion,
3 packaging, sale, and distribution of its Roundup® products, including the duty to take all
4 reasonable steps necessary to manufacture, promote, and/or sell a product that was not
5 unreasonably dangerous to consumers, users, and other persons coming into contact with the
6 product.

7 164. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant had a duty to exercise
8 reasonable care in the marketing, advertisement, and sale of its Roundup® products. Defendant’s
9 duty of care owed to consumers and the general public included providing accurate, true, and
10 correct information concerning the risks of using Roundup® and appropriate, complete, and
11 accurate warnings concerning the potential adverse effects of exposure to Roundup® and, in
12 particular, its active ingredient glyphosate.

13 165. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant knew or, in the exercise of
14 reasonable care, should have known of the hazards and dangers of Roundup® and specifically,
15 the carcinogenic properties of the chemical glyphosate.

16 166. Accordingly, at all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant knew or, in the
17 exercise of reasonable care, should have known that use of or exposure to its Roundup®
18 products could cause Plaintiff’s injuries and thus created a dangerous and unreasonable risk of
19 injury to the users of these products, including Plaintiff.

20 167. Defendant knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that
21 Roundup® is more toxic than glyphosate alone and that safety studies on Roundup®,
22 Roundup®’s adjuvants and “inert” ingredients, and/or the surfactant POEA were necessary to
23 protect Plaintiff from Roundup®.

1 168. Defendant knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that
2 tests limited to Roundup®’s active ingredient glyphosate were insufficient to prove the safety of
3 Roundup®.

4 169. Defendant also knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known
5 that users and consumers of Roundup® were unaware of the risks and the magnitude of the risks
6 associated with the use of and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate-containing products.

7 170. As such, Defendant breached its duty of reasonable care and failed to exercise
8 ordinary care in the design, research, development, manufacture, testing, marketing, supply,
9 promotion, advertisement, packaging, sale, and distribution of its Roundup® products, in that
10 Defendant manufactured and produced defective herbicides containing the chemical glyphosate,
11 knew or had reason to know of the defects inherent in its products, knew or had reason to know
12 that a user’s or consumer’s exposure to the products created a significant risk of harm and
13 unreasonably dangerous side effects, and failed to prevent or adequately warn of these risks and
14 injuries.

15 171. Defendant failed to appropriately and adequately test Roundup®, Roundup®’s
16 adjuvants and “inert” ingredients, and/or the surfactant POEA to protect Plaintiff from
17 Roundup®.

18 172. Despite its ability and means to investigate, study, and test its products and to
19 provide adequate warnings, Defendant has failed to do so. Indeed, Defendant has wrongfully
20 concealed information and has further made false and/or misleading statements concerning the
21 safety and/or exposure to Roundup® and glyphosate.

22 173. Defendant’s negligence included:
23
24

1 a. Manufacturing, producing, promoting, formulating, creating, developing,
2 designing, selling, and/or distributing its Roundup® products without thorough and
3 adequate pre- and post- market testing;

4 b. Manufacturing, producing, promoting, formulating, creating, developing,
5 designing, selling, and/or distributing Roundup® while negligently and/or intentionally
6 concealing and failing to disclose the results of trials, tests, and studies of exposure to
7 glyphosate, and, consequently, the risk of serious harm associated with human use of and
8 exposure to Roundup®;

9 c. Failing to undertake sufficient studies and conduct necessary tests to
10 determine whether or not Roundup® products and glyphosate-containing products were
11 safe for their intended use in agriculture, horticulture, and at-home use;

12 d. Failing to undertake sufficient studies and conduct necessary tests to
13 determine the safety of “inert” ingredients and/or adjuvants contained within Roundup®,
14 and the propensity of these ingredients to render Roundup® toxic, increase the toxicity of
15 Roundup®, whether these ingredients are carcinogenic, magnify the carcinogenic
16 properties of Roundup®, and whether or not “inert” ingredients and/or adjuvants were
17 safe for use;

18 e. Failing to use reasonable and prudent care in the design, research,
19 manufacture, formulation, and development of Roundup® products so as to avoid the risk
20 of serious harm associated with the prevalent use of Roundup®/glyphosate as an
21 herbicide;

22 f. Failing to design and manufacture Roundup® products so as to ensure
23 they were at least as safe and effective as other herbicides on the market;

1 g. Failing to provide adequate instructions, guidelines, and safety precautions
2 to those persons who Defendant could reasonably foresee would use and/or be exposed to
3 its Roundup® products;

4 h. Failing to disclose to Plaintiff, users, consumers, and the general public
5 that the use of and exposure to Roundup® presented severe risks of cancer and other
6 grave illnesses;

7 i. Failing to warn Plaintiff, users, consumers, and the general public that the
8 product's risk of harm was unreasonable and that there were safer and effective
9 alternative herbicides available to Plaintiff and other users or consumers;

10 j. Systematically suppressing or downplaying contrary evidence about the
11 risks, incidence, and prevalence of the side effects of Roundup® and glyphosate-
12 containing products;

13 k. Representing that its Roundup® products were safe for their intended use
14 when, in fact, Defendant knew or should have known that the products were not safe for
15 their intended use;

16 l. Declining to make or propose any changes to Roundup® products'
17 labeling or other promotional materials that would alert the consumers and the general
18 public of the risks of Roundup® and glyphosate;

19 m. Advertising, marketing, and recommending the use of Roundup®
20 products, while concealing and failing to disclose or warn of the dangers known by
21 Defendant to be associated with or caused by the use of or exposure to Roundup® and
22 glyphosate;

1 n. Continuing to disseminate information to its consumers, which indicate or
2 imply that Defendant's Roundup® products are not unsafe for use in the agricultural,
3 horticultural industries, and/or home use; and

4 o. Continuing the manufacture and sale of its products with the knowledge
5 that the products were unreasonably unsafe and dangerous.

6 174. Defendant knew and/or should have known that it was foreseeable that consumers
7 and/or users, such as Plaintiff, would suffer injuries as a result of Defendant's failure to exercise
8 ordinary care in the manufacturing, marketing, labeling, distribution, and sale of Roundup®.

9 175. Plaintiff did not know the nature and extent of the injuries that could result from
10 the intended use of and/or exposure to Roundup® or its active ingredient glyphosate.

11 176. As a proximate result of Defendant's wrongful acts and omissions in placing its
12 defective Roundup® products into the stream of commerce without adequate warnings of the
13 hazardous and carcinogenic nature of glyphosate, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer
14 severe and permanent physical and emotional injuries. Plaintiff has endured pain and suffering,
15 has suffered economic losses (including significant expenses for medical care and treatment),
16 and will continue to incur these expenses in the future.

17 177. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in
18 Plaintiff's favor for compensatory and other damages, together with interest, costs herein
19 incurred, attorneys' fees, and all such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
20 Plaintiff also demands a jury trial on the issues contained herein.

21 // // // //

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment in her favor and against Monsanto on each of the above-referenced claims and causes of action, awarding as follows:

a. compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount, including but not limited to pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-economic damages in an amount to be determined at trial of this action;

b. compensatory damages for past and future damages, including but not limited to Plaintiff's pain and suffering and for severe and permanent personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff, including health care costs and economic loss;

c. economic damages in the form of medical expenses, out-of-pocket expenses, lost earnings and other economic damages in an amount to be determined at trial of this action;

d. punitive damages, if the Court allows an Amended Complaint upon Plaintiff's motion;

e. pre- and post-judgment interest;

f. costs including reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, and other litigation expenses; and

g. any other relief the Court deems just and proper.

////

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all of the triable issues within this Complaint.

Dated: February 15, 2019

COLUCCIO LAW

s/ Kevin Coluccio

Kevin Coluccio, WSBA# 16245

Coluccio Law

2025 1st Avenue, Suite 1130

Seattle, WA 98121

kc@coluccio-law.com

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

BOWERSOX LAW FIRM, PC

s/ Jeffrey A. Bowersox

Jeffrey A. Bowersox, Pro Hac Vice *Anticipated*

Bowersox Law Firm, P.C.

3 Centerpointe Drive, Suite 190

Lake Oswego, OR 97035

jeffrey@bowersoxlaw.com

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff (EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

DEFENDANTS

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff, 2 U.S. Government Defendant, 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party), 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

Table with columns for Plaintiff (PTF) and Defendant (DEF) citizenship: Citizen of This State, Citizen of Another State, Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country, Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State, Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State, Foreign Nation.

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Large table with categories: CONTRACT, REAL PROPERTY, CIVIL RIGHTS, TORTS, PRISONER PETITIONS, FORFEITURE/PENALTY, LABOR, IMMIGRATION, BANKRUPTCY, SOCIAL SECURITY, FEDERAL TAX SUITS, OTHER STATUTES.

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- 1 Original Proceeding, 2 Removed from State Court, 3 Remanded from Appellate Court, 4 Reinstated or Reopened, 5 Transferred from Another District (specify), 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer, 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):

Brief description of cause:

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. DEMAND \$ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: JURY DEMAND: Yes No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions): JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER

DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:

- I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants.** Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and then the official, giving both name and title.
- (b) County of Residence.** For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
- (c) Attorneys.** Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting in this section "(see attachment)".
- II. Jurisdiction.** The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X" in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
 United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
 United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
 Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
 Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; **NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity cases.**)
- III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties.** This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this section for each principal party.
- IV. Nature of Suit.** Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If there are multiple nature of suit codes associated with the case, pick the nature of suit code that is most applicable. Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions](#).
- V. Origin.** Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.
 Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
 Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
 Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing date.
 Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
 Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or multidistrict litigation transfers.
 Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1407.
 Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket. **PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7.** Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to changes in statute.
- VI. Cause of Action.** Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. **Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.** Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
- VII. Requested in Complaint.** Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
 Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
 Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
- VIII. Related Cases.** This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.

Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.

Civil Action No. _____

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* _____
was received by me on *(date)* _____.

I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____
_____ on *(date)* _____; or

I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____
_____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on *(date)* _____, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

I served the summons on *(name of individual)* _____, who is
designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* _____
_____ on *(date)* _____; or

I returned the summons unexecuted because _____; or

Other *(specify)*: _____.

My fees are \$ _____ for travel and \$ _____ for services, for a total of \$ _____.

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: _____

Server's signature

Printed name and title

Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc: